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A GAME OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BETWEEN
A THERAPIST AND A MENTALLY ILL PATIENT
KJETIL K. HAUGEN and SOLFRID VATNE
Abstract. In this paper, we follow up research of Vatne [23] related to how mentally
ill patients could (and perhaps should) be treated. We propose, model, and ana-
lyze a simple sequential game of incomplete and asymmetric information where the
patient moves first, signaling behavior which is observed by the therapist with lack
or limited knowledge of the actual patient type. We assume greatly approximated
strategy spaces both for patient and therapist, but will still claim that our results
increase knowledge of this important relation. Knowledge that may be critically
important in continued improved treatment of patients with mental illness.
1. Introduction, motivation and outline
1.1. Introduction
It is a well-known fact that both diagnosis and efficient treatment of mentally ill
patients is difficult. So far, medical science has struggled both with categorizing
diseases as well as with providing treatment which with relative certainty will cure
or ease patients’ symptoms. So far, even though most experts seem to agree on
the opposite, much treatment is performed through medication – often by drugs
with heavy adverse effects.
If such a description (even though obviously biased) is somewhat close to reality,
one would expect a problem of the following type. If the therapist is uncertain on
what type of patient he (or she) is treating, the potential for successful treatment
is limited. In many instances, one should hence expect that wrong treatment
is prescribed for many patients with strong negative outcomes for the individual
patient and, in a longer perspective, for society. International literature, focusing
on patients’ views illustrates such a perspective [6, 12]. Additionally, the fact
that the therapist (and the system) may have incentives and power towards calm
patients (a typical effect of heavy medication) makes the situation even worse.
Vatne’s research [20–23] is concentrated on such topics. In her studies of milieu-
therapists’ limit-setting in mental health, she uses the terms Acknowledging as
opposed to Corrective actions – symbolizing a simplification of the “treatment
space”. She argues that extensive use of corrective treatment may be the biggest
obstacle in obtaining a constructive cooperation between patient and therapist,
and that the corrective action itself constructs conflicts which again may lead to
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more necessary (or better unnecessary) corrective action - a viscous circle. The
following two observed narratives from Vatne’s research illustrate such a situation:
1) The narrative of correcting uncleanness
Ann, the patient in this narrative, a 60-year-old woman diag-
nosed with Schizophrenia, was reported to have declined to clean
herself in 14 days. The responsible nurse decides for herself that
this day Ann has to take a shower because she smells and can
get sore. When we enter Ann’s room, the nurse asks Ann if she
wants to take a shower before or after breakfast. Ann says she
has already cleaned herself and that it now is time for breakfast.
After the meal, the nurse tries to motivate Ann to shower, by
explaining how important it is to take care of her good skin and
well-being. She walks over to Ann’s wardrobe to get her some
new clean clothes. Ann screams: “Don’t open my closet!” The
nurse’s answer is that she feels pity for how messy Ann looks.
Ann then points up to the ceiling, saying: “It is dirty here too,
somebody should come and clean here as well.” “You should
think more about your own appearance, you look negligent”, the
nurse answers. The next half hour, the nurse tries to make an
agreement with Ann taking a shower by seducing her in varied
ways: offers coffee, cakes and smoke, and warns her that the
cakes might quickly be eaten by other patients. Ann mumbles: “I
am out of control.” After a while Ann walks to the bathroom.
The nurse following Ann says: “When you now are nearly un-
dressed, I will wash you below, and put on some lotion.” Ann
bursts out: “You are making me even crazier!” When we meet
Ann the next day, Ann tells the nurse: “You are a bad nurse.
You don’t deserve any cake and coffee either!” Afterwards, the
nurse’s reflection was that Ann’s reaction was not expected and
that Ann probably was too intelligent and saw through her way
of limit-setting.
In the literature, such a correcting process; containing a continuum of interventions
from informing, motivating, reality orienting and fictitious agreements to coercion,
are described to be therapeutic [7, 9]. However, the effect on the patient is being
out of control and humiliating, which is counteracting experiences of therapy.
2) A patient’s unforeseen aggressive outburst on “normal caring”
Torill has a serious mental illness and is hospitalized in an acute
psychiatric ward due to aggravated symptoms. She has been con-
fined to her room against her will as a result of her current men-
tal condition and sometimes aggressive behavior. Various milieu-
therapists are responsible for Torill while she is isolated in her
room. Torill has several times tried to escape from her room to
be with the other patients in the living room, especially during
the meals. She says she likes to eat together with other people.
When today’s afternoon coffee with cakes is served, they forget
Torill. Torill asks for the coffee, and her responsible nurse leaves
A GAME OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION... 3
the isolate to fetch it. Since there are no cakes left, she returns
with a sandwich. Torill responds with anger and frustration and
accuses the nurse of denying her even a measly piece of cake.
Torill then runs out of the room to look for the cakes herself.
When she returns without cakes, the nurse tries to explain what
had happened. But Torill is still angry and confronts the nurse
with a torrent of accusations. She speaks and acts in a threaten-
ing manner, and, with her mouth full of food, spits at the nurse.
That results in the nurse withdrawing and leaving the room. The
nurse’s reflection was that the patient’s reaction on a sandwich
as a substitute to a cake was totally unexpected and she was not
able to cope with the situation.
Vatne discusses and explains the concept at hand in the latter narrative – a weak
correcting (or acknowledging) intervention in [23]. An acknowledging intervention
to information could be to say: I can understand if it is so that you felt offended
while you were offered a sandwich instead of a cake...?
1.2. Motivation
The main motivation behind this study is an idea of approaching this problem
from a (presumably) novel and different perspective – game theory. Game theory
offers a set of tools to investigate, analyze and sometimes predict outcomes of
situations involving decision making among more than one agent, where the utility
of agents is constructed so that individual utility is a function of other agents’ as
well as own decisions. More specifically, games of incomplete information, offer
tools which cope with situations where agents’ individual pay-offs (e.g., types) may
be unknown to other agents, a situation clearly resembling the situation briefly
discussed in Subsection 1.1.
1.3. Outline
In Section 2, we investigate and discuss relevant literature with emphasis on appli-
cations of game theory related to treatment of mentally ill patients. In Section 3 we
propose our game framework and discuss its benefits and limitations. The model
is analyzed in Section 4, while concluding remarks and suggestions for further
research are left for Section 5.
2. Relevant literature
Game Theory (GT) has been (although not primarily) a focus of interest in the field
of health research since 1960. The theory has especially been applied to themes
such as risk analysis in health care costs studies [1, 14, 16] and management re-
search [5, 10]. Topics more close to health phenomenon as for instance medical
ethics are treated in [15] while various psychological issues as rationality in so-
cial interaction, cooperation and medical consultation can be observed in [3,4,18].
However, all those articles are mainly using GT from a theoretical perspective.
Research has mainly been focusing on how GT contributes in explaining empiri-
cally observed phenomena, e.g., cooperation in antisocial personality disorder [4]
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and primary care [17], and is not intended to provide a test of predictions based
on GT. Some recent interesting microbiological studies present GT as a basis for
modeling systems of interaction between tumor cells [2, 11, 19], but do not seem
very relevant in our setting. As a consequence, to the best of our knowledge, we
have found no systematic accounts of Game Theory used to analyze a sequential
game of incomplete information in a patient-provider relationship.
3. Modeling
We adopt a modeling structure much in the original spirit of Harsanyi [8], perhaps
more modernly described in Rasmusen’s Follow the Leader III [13].
We define two players: the therapist (T ) and the patient (P). The players
engage in a two-stage sequential game where P moves first. That is, we assume that
the patient makes a signal of say Cooperative (Passive - P ) nature or alternatively
more Opposing (Aggressive - A). Hence, we define the set of actions for player P
as {A,P}. Likewise (for simplicity), we restrict the actions for the therapist to be
Corrective (C) or Recognizing/Acknowledging (R)1. So, the action set for player
T are chosen in {C,R}.
Furthermore, we assume that T has prior information of the patient type defined
by a three-point probability density; say p = [p1, p2, 1−p1−p2] where p1, p2, 1−p1−
p2 are probabilities of the patient being of types 1, 2 or 3 respectively. It seems
reasonable to interpret these three patient-types as different degrees of illness,
where type 1 could be mild, 2 is average while 3 is significantly more severe.
Introducing general pay-offs for the two players (aij for T and bij for P where
j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) the gaming situation (without incomplete
information) may be illustrated as shown in Figure 1.
In Figure 2, the game is shown after the Harsanyi Transformation.
In Figure 2, the game is transformed from a game of incomplete information into
a game of complete but imperfect information. Nature N is introduced as a player,
making his move (choosing the patient type 1, 2 or 3) unobserved by the therapist.
This can be observed by the dashed information sets indicating that the therapist
does not know in which of the nodes T1, T3, T5 or T2, T4, T6 he is. Note also that
the patient knows who he is, hence this is a game of asymmetric information where
the patient knows his own type, while the therapist is uninformed on the patient
type. One could of course question such an assumption, certain situations might
obviously call for other models including less rational patients and better informed
therapists. However, we stick to this formulation in subsequent paragraphs.
4. Analysis
Analysing incomplete information games can be done in various ways. The classical
(Harsanyi) way includes “guessing” on a Nash Equilibrium (NE) and computing
(Bayes) best replies in order to confirm NE existence. In this case, this method
seems appropriate. The reason is straightforward. Underlying the problem is an
1Obviously, both the patient and the therapist will have much wider action spaces to operate
on in the real world. However, we deliberately try to simplify as much as possible in order to get
a traceable game to analyze.






















































































































































Figure 2. The game after the Harsanyi Transformation.
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implicit hypothesis related to misuse of therapist corrective action. The main
point in Vatne’s research [20–23], is focused on such a hypothesis. In addition,
Vatne points out real world cases which strongly support such a hypothesis. As
a consequence, we are mainly interested in what forces might drive such NEs.
That is, what values of model inputs (p and aij , b
i
j) drives strongly corrective NEs.
For instance; given a pay-off structure (given values on aij , b
i
j), what patient types
receive corrective treatment and vice versa. Alternatively; given a certain patient
type, what therapist regimes tend to choose corrective treatment. Hopefully, an-
swering such questions may shed light on how treatment should be organized in
order to minimize corrective treatment. Another line of thinking could be to de-
fine various groups of aij , b
i
js, symbolizing different existing therapeutic regimes
and check how these regimes react to different patient types by computing NEs as
a function of patient type p.
Ultimately, we aim to reach conclusions related to how the pay-off structure
must be defined in order to minimize (or reach more acceptable) levels of corrective
action. This, as opposed to a classical prohibitive system. That is, instead of
defining what is allowed and what not, we aim to establish a mechanism (how
must aijs and b
i
js relate to each other) in order to achieve certain targets related
to use (misuse) of corrective treatment action.
Anyway, we start out trying to keep the input set p, aij , b
i
j as general as possible
to keep the analytic space as open as possible.
Before the actual analysis, it is meaningful to outline all possible (pure strat-
egy) NEs for the game defined in Figures 1 and 2. The complete set (through






Table 1. Possible pure strategy Nash Equilibrium strategies for the therapist.
NE Label
(P |1, P |2, P |3) easy
(A|1, A|2, A|3) difficult
(P |1, P |2, A|3) expected i
(P |1, A|2, A|3) expected ii
(P |1, A|2, P |3)
(A|1, P |2, P |3)
(A|1, P |2, A|3)
(A|1, A|2, P |3)
Table 2. Possible pure strategy Nash Equilibrium strategies for the patient.
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the notation X|Y means that the therapist responds with X after observing the
patient’s action Y 2. Furthermore, we have labeled each of these four pure strategy
NEs with labels; default, observed, utopia and impossible.
The first label, default, corresponds to the situation as we would expect the
system to be designed for. That is, difficult patients are treated with corrective
action, while less difficult patients are treated with acknowledging action. All other
three labels can to some extent be viewed as anomalies, The label observed refers
to a situation we “are afraid” we observe to often, utopia, where any patient type
is treated nicely (some might state that this is the objective) and finally, a reversed
default or impossible NE where aggressive patients are treated with ease while
cooperative patients are treated harshly.
Table 2 contains similar information for the patient. Now, we can (in principle)
combine any element in Tables 1 and 2 to produce 32 possible pure strategy NEs.
Half of the NE strategies in Table 2 are of course silly. The last four ones, under the
mid horizontal line, are in conflict with our initial definition of patient behavior.
A patient acting more aggressively in an illness state, defined as less severe makes
no sense. Additionally, the two first lines of Table 2 are plausible, but not very
interesting in this setting. After all, we are aiming to study the conflict related to
therapeutic actions in the action set acknowledging or correcting, and a patient
either responding only aggressively or passively no matter who he is seems unin-
teresting in this setting. The candidates labeled expected i and expected ii
are both relevant candidates for analysis. However, to keep the complexity at
a reasonable level we stick to a single expected patient behavior unless anything
else is explicitly stated. That is, when we in subsequent paragraphs mention the
(observed) NE, we actually mean the (expected i; observed) NE.
The aim of the forthcoming analysis, is hence to investigate which parametric
sets lead to which of the four defined NE-categories in Table 1.
We start by analyzing the (expected i; default) NE. This construct may be
interpreted as a situation where patients are treated and react as they “should”.
It is appropriate to write out the actual meaning of this NE





As (4.1) indicates, the tractable patient (P) reacts passively (P ) if he is of type 1 or
2, while he reacts aggressively (A) if he is of type 3. The therapist (T ) treats the
patient correctively (C) after observing A while acknowledging (or recognizing)
treatment is implemented if the therapist observes (P ).
The computations involved in securing (4.1) as an NE starts by calculating so
called Bayesian belief updates. Bayes law in our notation can be expressed as
Prob(1|P ) = Prob(P |1) · Prob(1)∑3
j=1 Prob(P |j) · Prob(j)
. (4.2)
2In any incomplete information game, we must look for so called contingent equilibrium
strategies. That is, the therapist should treat the patient differently depending on patient type,
which of course is reasonable. This does not rule out the possibility of treating the patient
independently of patient type as NEs observed and utopia indicate.
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Given our proposed NE (4.1), it is straightforwardly deduced that Prob(P |1) =
Prob(P |2) = 1 and Prob(P |3) = 0. Then, it follows from (4.2) that
Prob(1|P ) = 1 · p1





Now, as Prob(P |3) = 0, the same holds for Prob(3|P ) and Prob(2|P ) = 1 −
Prob(1|P ) or






Then, we move to examining best replies. If the therapist observes P , he can
choose actions C or R.
1) Choosing C
Expected pay-off for the therapist choosing C after observing P , ET (C|P ),
is








Expected pay-off for the therapist choosing R after observing P , ET (R|P ),
is







Now, to secure our prescribed NE (4.1), the therapist must choose R after observ-














As p1 + p2 > 0, we can rewrite (4.3) as
a12 · p1 + a22 · p2 > a11 · p1 + a21 · p2. (4.4)
Consequently, the constraint (4.4) must be satisfied to secure the prescribed NE
(4.1).
However, this is not the only constraint needed. Let us find the remaining ones.
The next step is to analyze T ’s best response to observing A. This situation is
easier (deterministic) as Prob(1|A) = Prob(2|A) = 0 and Prob(3|A = 1). The
point here, is to secure that the C|A-outcome is realized. Given that T believes
the state of nature is 3, his best response to A should be C. This is easily secured




At this point, we have shown that T ’s strategy (C|A,R|P )) is his best response to
P’s strategy (P |1, P |2, A|3). Now in order to fully secure the prescribed NE (4.1),
we also need to demonstrate (or to be more precise, find conditions for) that P’s
strategy (P |1, P |2, A|3) is his best response to T ’s strategy (C|A,R|P )).
Note (from Figure 2) that P can choose either P or A in any of the nodes P1,
P2 or P3. It is straightforward to run through and find best replies for P, given
the prescribed NE, as follows:
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A, knowing that T2 chooses C, pay-off must be b13.




By a similar set of arguments
In P2,P chooses between









In P3,P chooses between








At this point, it may be appropriate to sum up what we actually have found so
far. The set of inequalities (4.9) presented in the box below must be satisfied to
secure the NE (4.1)














Now, a reasonable continued analytic strategy may be to repeat the above
calculations for a different NE - namely, the (expected i;observed) NE. If we
apply the alternative (and more suitable) notation, this one may be expressed as;
(P |1, P |2, A|3;C|A,C|P ).
We choose not to repeat these calculations in full, simply note that the in-
equality sign in Equation (4.4) must be reversed, while Equation (4.5) remains
unchanged.
For Equations (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8), the change of NE from (P |1, P |2, A|3;
C|A,R|P ) to (P |1, P |2, A|3;C|A,C|P ) leads to changes where all bi2 must be re-
placed by bi1∀i ∈ 1, 2, 3.
Consequently, we can sum up our findings in this situation as
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5. Discussion, conclusions and further research
5.1. Discussion and Conclusions
At this point, it may be fruitful to sum up our results so far. We have chosen to
analyze two different NEs, the (expected i; default) NE and the (expected
i;observed) NE. The “boxed” inequalities (4.9) and (4.10) state necessary con-
straints for realizing each of these NEs respectively.
Simply put, we can interpret the (expected i; default) NE as a game out-
come in which adequate strictness is applied to patients, while the (expected
i;observed) NE involves more than adequate strict treatment. Alternatively,
and perhaps less normatively, we can interpret the two situations as a patient-
dependent – as opposed to a patient-independent treatment scheme.
The reason why we are interested in comparing these two situations is an inher-
ent hypothesis (to some extent confirmed by [20–23]) of real world existence of too
much patient independent treatment in psychiatry. Given such a hypothesis, the
constraints (4.9), (4.10) tell us how it might be possible to move from one (unde-
sirable) situation to another (desirable) situation. In practice, such a change could
involve various regulative means – here symbolized through the manipulation of
model parameters, b’s, a’s and p’.s
If we move on comparing inequalities (4.9) and (4.10), we observe immediately






is unchanged between the two NEs. The
actual meaning of this inequality is that an aggressive patient (type 3) should
be treated correctively (the therapist should choose C with greater utility than
choosing R) if the patient signals aggression (patient choice A). In this setting,
such an outcome means that any regulative action involving these two parameters
will have no impact whatsoever on the two given NEs. From a game theory point
of view, this result might be considered banal, but it still introduces a certain
practical lesson. Certain infrastructural settings may not have any impact on
relevant Nash Equilibria.
Another far more interesting observation to make in the comparison between
(4.9) and (4.10) is a certain mathematical separability. By this, we refer to the fact
that the structure of the equations within each box (4.9) as well as (4.10) indicate
a clear separation between b’s on side and a’s and p’s on the other side. None of
these inequalities bind all parameters together. This implies an easier regulative
situation, than we might fear. For instance, the p’s in the model indicates the
degree of uncertainty the therapist has related to the patient type. The structure
of the inequalities tell us that if we (say) compare a situation with very limited
information (p’s closer to 13 ) of patient types with a situation with greater precision
(p’s close to 0 or 1), it is only necessary to analyze a single inequality - namely
the first one.
Alternatively, we can interpret this observation as a regulative separability be-
tween patient and therapist. Wishing to change parameters in order to achieve
some desirable NE, we could change utilities for patient and therapist one by one,
without a need to see them together. This is good, in the sense that it eases
practical regulative measures.
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Our final (and as we see it, most interesting result) is slightly more complex.




1 + ε, ε > 0 but small. (5.1)
Before we explain the meaning of this assumption (5.1), note that it implies:
bi2 > b
i
1 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. (5.2)
Referring to Figure 2, it is straightforward to realize that (5.1) means that any
patient type launching a passive (P ) signal should be treated with recognizing (R)
rather than Corrective (C) action. In our opinion, such an assumption cannot be
considered controversial.
The next step in the argument is to assume that we are in the (undesirable)
NE. That is, inequalities (4.10) are all satisfied.
Now, let us inspect the alternative NE – or inequalities (4.9) and start by








Given assumption (5.1) and its consequence (5.2), it should be relatively straight-
forward to realize that inequalities (5.3) also must be satisfied3.
Finally, we know that b31 < b
3




1. Now, the ε comes




Now, we have shown the following: Given our (reasonable) assumption in (5.1),
all inequalities 2 up to and including 5 in (4.9) are already satisfied, and the only
remaining inequality we need to regulate is the first one, which needs to be changed
from
a12 · p1 + a22 · p2 < a11 · p1 + a21 · p2
to
a12 · p1 + a22 · p2 > a11 · p1 + a21 · p2
where the only difference is the direction of the inequality sign.
Apart from the fact that we have obtained a simple (numeric) expression defin-
ing the move from an undesirable NE to a desirable one, this result has another
obvious consequence. If our aim is to move from a patient independent to a patient
dependent treatment outcome, it makes no sense to regulate patient infrastruc-
ture. On the other hand, it makes all sense to regulate therapist infrastructure.
This is an obvious consequence of the argument above, and may not be intuitively
obvious. Hence, it makes for instance no sense to believe that improving conditions
for patients in any way will have any impact on treatment strategies in the ther-
apist’s hand. On the contrary, what we have shown above, is that only therapist
pay-off (or utility – a’s) combined with therapist knowledge and understanding of
the patient (p’s) matter.
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5.2. Model limitations and suggestions for further research
Obviously, our results obtained and discussed in Subsection 5.1 are based on the
model at hand. At best, this model is an extreme simplification of reality. Note
for instance, that the only incomplete information bit is from the therapist to the
patient. It would probably be far more realistic (possibly also more interesting)
if a more “symmetric” asymmetry had been introduced. Say, the patient is also
unsure on the therapist-type. In addition, our modeling framework limits itself
to a one-shot treatment situation, also very different from reality. In the real
world, a therapist and a patient, would meet more than once, possibly learning
about each other during such a process. This would of course lead to a dynamic
game of incomplete information, unfortunately not easy either to formulate or
to analyze. Not to mention the fact that modern treatment involves more than
a single patient/therapist relation, calling for a multi-player setting.
Still, we feel that this way of attacking the problem is both new and interesting.
It opens up for a more analytic way of analyzing how such relations should be
constructed as well as possibly regulated, in order to maintain and reach certain
goals related to treatment quality. We do (obviously) not see this as an end-
point, rather a start of a different way of research within psychiatric nursing.
As pointed out above, many directions exist when it comes to refining the game
theoretic modeling framework. Another line of possible application could be a more
empirical attack, where one tries to actually estimate all model parameters in order
to explicitly find necessary regulative strategies (i.e., finding out which and how
much various parameters must be changed in order to achieve certain goals.)
Let us finally point out, that in this work, we have focused on psychiatric care.
As most readers might realize, this model concept is not limited to the psychiatric
case. For instance, certain somatic diseases resemble this setting. Think about
hypochondriacs or people who want a certain diagnosis. Hence, situations where
the challenge for the therapist is to decide whether the patient is sick or not.
Obviously a candidate for similar models.
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